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JOINT AUTHORSHIP: AN UNCOMFORTABLE
FIT WITH TENANCY IN COMMON
Avner D. Sofer*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1915, Judge Learned Hand ushered in the beginnings of the joint
authorship doctrine stating that he had "been able to find strangely little law
regarding the rights of joint authors."1 For more than sixty years, courts
have struggled with the concept of joint authorship, prior to its definition in
the 1976 Copyright Act.2 Today, more than twenty years later, there is
"strangely little law" regarding the relationship of joint authors and their
rights and obligations toward each other.
3
The hostility courts have toward the joint works doctrine4 has resulted
in a scarcity of case law. Courts have been hesitant to become involved in
the intimate relationship between joint authors, which is a relationship
steeped in artistic volatility, yet involving deep contractual and financial dis-
putes.5 Historically, courts have been loathe to become involved in these
intertwined and intricate relationships. 6  Courts have avoided familial dis-
putes, such as those involving husband and wife or father and son, finding it
* The author is a writer of fiction and nonfiction and has received first prize in the Nathan
Burkan ASCAP writing competition. The author wishes to thank Todd Whitely, Esq., Timothy
Griggs, Esq. and Walter DeLorell III, Esq. for their unfailing faith and assistance and Robert Lind,
Esq. for his guidance and strength.
1. Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
2. A joint work is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their con-
tributions be merged into "inseparable or independent parts of a unitary whole." 17 U.S.C.A. §
201 (a) note (West 1996) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
3. Maurel, 220 F.2d at 199.
4. See Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective Creativity,
10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 315 (1992) (arguing that "in many particular instances copy-
right refuses to acknowledge the existence of 'joint authorship,' or does so only grudgingly");
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988), af'd on
other grounds, 490 U.S. 730, 753 n.32 (1989) (refraining from passing judgment on the applica-
bility of the joint authorship provisions because neither party sought review of the remand order).
"Joint authors co-owning copyright in a work are 'deemed to be tenants in common', [or] with
'each having an independent right to use or license the copyright, subject only to a duty to account
to the other co-owner for any profits earned thereby."' Id. (quoting W. Patry, Latmans The Copy-
ight Law 116 (6th ed. 1986)).
5. Jaszi, supra note 4, at 315 n.73.
6. J.R. Maurice Gautreau, Demystifying the Fiduciary Mystique, 68 CAN. B. REV. 1, 2
(1989).
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more convenient and more judicially prudent to allow the parties to resolve
their own private matters. 7 The joint author relationship is the copyright law
version of a familial relationship. It is the most intimate relationship avail-
able under copyright law.
While courts have tripped over each other trying to sweep the joint
author issue away, the legislature has remained cryptic and aloof.8 Al-
though the legislature has stated that joint authors should be "treated gener-
ally as tenants in common,"9 it has not given advice on the issue. Further-
more, the legislature has not conducted any studies to validate its
revolutionary proposal that an intellectual property relationship should be
seen in the same light as a real property concept. After all, until the 1976
Copyright Act, only one other relationship had ever been categorized as a
tenancy in common. Moreover, the legislature has failed to clarify how joint
authors are to be "treated generally as tenants in common." It has not ex-
plained which tenancy in common rights and obligations affect joint authors,
and has instead left these issues to the courts.
Treating joint authors as tenants in common is an intellectually in-
triguing theory. However, forcing the intellectual property concept of joint
authorship into the laws of real property can be.an arduous and, at times,
controversial task. Most of the remedies available to tenants in common are
an uncomfortable fit when applied to joint authors.
Thus far, courts have successfully avoided the issue of joint authors as
tenants in common, relegating the issue strictly to dicta. 10 They have found
7. Id.
8. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
(stating joint authors should be "treated generally as tenants in common, with each co-owner hav-
ing an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the
other co-owners for any profits."); see also MELVILLE NIM4M4ER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 6.09, at 6-29 (1998) [hereinafter NBIER ON COPYRIGHT].
9. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121.
10. Communityfor Creative Non-Violence, 846 F.2d at 1485, 1498; Korman v. Iglesias, 736
F. Supp. 261, 265 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (applying Florida law to the plaintiffs claim for share of royal-
ties derived from joint work noting that other courts have held that "Congress must have intended
that co-authors may claim for an accounting or otherwise proceed under common law principles
since the Copyright Act makes no mention of how co-authors should enforce their rights to royal-
ties as against each other."); Picture Music, Inc. v. Boume, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640, 646-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972).
It is clearly established that where a truly "joint work", is created, each co-owner is
akin to a tenant in common. Accordingly ... compensation obtained from the uni-
lateral exploitation of the joint work by one of the co-owners without the permission
of the others is held in a constructive trust for the mutual benefit of all co-owners
and there is a duty to account therefor.
Id. (citations omitted); see supra text accompanying note 8 (noting that the relationship ofjoint
owners is that of a tenancy-in-common).
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more creative ways of dealing with the problems associated with joint
authorship, most notably relying on the more bright-line law of contracts. 1
1
However, as the entertainment industry grows more sophisticated and the
avenues of collaboration diversify, more courts will be forced to address the
issues inherent in categorizing joint authors as tenants in common. Perhaps
the most important and far reaching dilemma imbedded in categorizing joint
authors as tenants in common is whether joint authors possess or maintain a
fiduciary relationship. The questions remain as to what duties they owe to
each other and what rights each should possess.
This Article develops the proposition that the legal relationship existing
between joint authors, each of whom has the right to control and exploit the
same creation, is so intertwined and intimate that it establishes a fiduciary
relationship similar to, if not more protective, than tenants in common. This
Article will further propose that the inherent duties in a fiduciary relation-
ship should be subtly adapted to the more vulnerable and susceptible nature
of the joint author relationship.
Part II of this Article explores the definition of the current state of joint
authorship, and traces the history of joint authorship through the 1976
Copyright Act. Part III examines the rights and responsibilities of tenants in
common and compares them with those of joint authors. Part IV describes
the fiduciary relationship, its history and its significance to tenancy in com-
mon and joint authorship. Part V discusses the duties joint authors should
have as fiduciaries. Part VI explores how traditional fiduciary relationships
can be breached, and explains how the uniqueness of the joint author rela-
tionship gives rise to the possibility of breaches not found in other areas of
the law. Part VII analyzes the remedies available to joint authors for breach
of fiduciary duty and abuse of power by co-authors. Finally, Part VIII con-
cludes that joint authors each should be given the status of a fiduciary, along
with all of a fiduciary's rights and obligations.
II. JOINT AUTHORSHIP
Joint authors are co-creators of a joint work. 12  Once two or more
authors create a joint work13 they become co-owners 14 of the copyright in
that work.' Each co-creator has the right to use the work or license its use
11. Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
12. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) note (West 1996) (Historical and Statutory Notes). A joint work is
a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
"inseparable or independent parts of a unitary whole." Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (stating that the authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work). But
1998]
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to a third party. 16 The joint author has an equal right to possess and utilize
every part of the jointly owned work. 17  Further, the joint author has the
right to make testamentary transfers of his interest and to convey or lease his
undivided interest to a third party. 
18
The 1976 Copyright Act 19 was the first legislative attempt to address
the issue of joint authorship. 20 Previously it had been a common law princi-
ple. 1 The early cases focused on the necessity of a common plan, which re-
quired the parties to work together.2 2 Thereafter, the emphasis shifted to the
see Community for Creative Non-Violence, 846 F.2d at 1496 (maintaining that a made for hire
work is not a joint work).
16. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
Co-owner has "an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of ac-
counting to the other co-owners for any profits." Id.
17. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE § 4.2.2, at 385
(explaining that "each copyright co-owner is entitled to exploit the copyright herself or to license
others to do so"); NIMvMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, §6.10, at 6-30 (stating that "a joint
owner, may, without obtaining the consent of the other joint owners, either exploit the work him-
selW or grant a nonexclusive license to third parties.").
18. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.09, at 6-29.
Unless expressly so agreed, the relationship is not that of a joint tenancy wherein the
last surviving joint owner becomes sole owner of the entire work. The prevailing
rule under the concept of tenancy-in-common is that upon the death of each joint
owner, his heirs or legatees acquire his respective share of the joint work.
Id.
19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1996).
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) (defining a joint work); SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., (Comm. Print 1960) [here-
inafter SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS] (stating that the 1909 Act did
not mention joint authorship and that the legislative history to the 1909 Act was also silent);
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.01, at 6-3 n.1 (stating that "[tlhe 1909 Act did not
expressly refer to the doctrine ofjoint ownership").
21. See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.01, at 6-3 n. 1.
22. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir.
1944), modified, 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944) (defining a joint work as "a joint laboring in fur-
therance of a common design" (quoting Levy v. Rutley, 6 L.R.-C.P. 523, 529 (Eng. 1871)) and
stating that the parties must "mean their contributions ... to be embodied in a single work");
Maurel v. Smith, 271 F. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921) ("[t]he pith of joint authorship consists in co-
operation, in a common design") (quoting COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHTS 109-110 (4th ed.
1904); Shapiro Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 115 F. Supp. 754, 758-59 (S.D.N.Y.
1953) (stating that joint authorship has been defined as "joint laboring in furtherance of a common
design" (quoting Levy, 6 L.R.-C.P. at 529) and that the first author must have intended that his
work be complemented by the contribution of someone else), rev 'd on other grounds, 221 F.2d
569 (2d Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); G. Ricordi & Co. v.
Columbia Graphophone Co., 258 F. 72, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) (defining joint authorship as "[a] joint
labor in carrying out a common design"); Levy, 6 L.R.-C.P. at 529 (stating that "to constitute joint
authorship there must be a common design"); Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 199-200 (S.D.N.Y.
1915) (stating "[w]hen several collaborators knowingly engage in the production of a piece which
is to be presented originally as a whole only, they adopt that common design").
JOINT AUTHORSHIP: AN UNCOMFORTABLE FIT
common intent of the co-authors, 23 and finally to the subjective intent of
each author separately.24 Essentially, the 1976 Act codified this judge made
law. 25
Courts had a number of options after which to pattern the rules of joint
ownership. The English rule, developed at the end of the eighteenth centur',
required all co-owners to consent before any interest could be exploited.
However, United States courts rejected this rule because it was too difficult
for a copyright licensee to obtain the consent of all co-owners.27
The first U.S. rule was formulated in the nineteenth century. 28 It al-
lowed each co-owner to exploit the work freely without the other co-owner's
consent and with no duty to account for profits. 29 Eventually, this rule was
rejected because it took away the incentive to create joint works since one
ambitious owner could overly exploit and destroy the value of the work for
the others.30 Now, each co-owner may exploit the jointly owned work for
non-exclusive licenses without the consent of the other owners, so long as
they account for all profits that result from the exploitation.
3 1
III. TENANCY IN COMMON
American jurisprudence adopted the tenancy in common concept from
English common law. 32 Tenancy in common is a form of concurrent owner-ship, which allows more than one owner to hold an interest in the same
23. See Edward B. Marks v. Music Corp, 140 F.2d at 267. "[I]t makes no difference
whether the authors work in concert, or even whether they know each other; it is enough that they
mean their contributions to be complementary in the sense that they are to be embodied in a single
work." Id.
24. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946);
Donna v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 374 F. Supp. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
120 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659, 5736. "The touchstone here is the intention, at
the time the writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit, al-
though the parts themselves may be either 'inseparable' . . . or 'interdependent'.,.." Id.
25. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659, 5726;. S.
REP. No. 94-473, at 104 (1975).
26. Powell v. Head, 12 Ch. D. 686 (Eng. 1879); Cescinsky v. George Routledge & Sons,
Ltd., 2 K.B. 325 (Eng. 1916).
27. Proprietors of Monumoi Great Beach v. Rogers, 1 Mass. 159, 163 (1804).
28. Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458 (1874).
29. Id.
30. Accountability Among Co-Owners of Statutory Copyright, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1550,
1556 (1959).
31. Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 633 (9th Cir. 1984); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
32. E. H. BuRN, CHESHIRE AND BURN'S MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 208 (14th ed.
1988).
1998]
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33
property. Tenants in common own separate undivided shares of the whole
estate. Each tenant has an equal right to possess and utilize every part of
the property, limited only by the concurrent rights of the co-owners. 5 Fur-
ther, each tenant has the right to occupy the entire estate without any obliga-
tion to pay rent.36  However, tenants who utilize minerals or deposits from
the property are obligated to pay half the profit to their co-tenant.37 Simi-
larly, the tenant is obligated to pay any co-tenant in common half the net in-
come received from licensing the minerals to a third party.38
Tenants in common hold no right of survivorship.39 When one tenant in
common dies, their interest passes to their heirs. 40 Each tenant in common
has the right to make a testamentary transfer of his interests.4 ' If a tenant
42dies intestate, any interest passes under the statutes of descent. The tenant
in common has the right to convey the undivided interest or lease it to a third
party.43 Further, tenants in common need not have obtained their interests
from the same source or at the same time. 4 Tenants in common can also
change their equal rights by agreement. 45  There is no duty to account for
33. Id. at 207. By concurrent interest it is meant that "[tihe owner of an interest in land may
be entitled to possession either alone or in conjunction with other persons. All such persons are
said to hold [title] concurrently, or in co-ownership, and to have concurrent interests." Id.
34. Tenants in common all occupy "promiscuously." Id. at 216. If A and B are tenants in
common, "A has an equal right with B to possession of the whole land." Id This united right to
possession is the only one of the four unities that tenancy in common shares with joint tenancy.
Id. Unlike joint tenants, tenants in common "may each hold different interests" (i.e., one may be
entitled to two-thirds and the other to one-third, acquired under different titles and at different
times). Id.
35. CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 216 (2d ed.
1988) ("stating [elach co-tenant has the theoretical right to possess and enjoy the entire property,
limited only by the concurrent exercise of the same right by other co-tenants"); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 42
So. 2d 438 (Miss. 1949).
36. MOYNIHAN, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. This distinguishes tenancy in common from joint tenancy. In joint tenancy, there is a
right of survivorship. The surviving joint tenant becomes sole owner of the entire estate. Id.;
Wolfe, 42 So. 2d at 438-39.
40. Wolfe, 42 So. 2d at 439.
41. Wilk v. Vencill, 180 P.2d 351, 354 (Cal. 1947); Sun Oil Co. v. Oswell, 62 So. 2d 783
(Ala. 1953); Carr v. Deking, 765 P.2d 40 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
42. ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.3, at 207 (1984).
43. PATRICK K. HETRICK & JAMES B. MCLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL ESTATE LAW IN
NORTH CAROLINA §7-6, at 184 (1994).
44. MOYNIHAN, supra note 35, at 214. However, the circumstances may be a factor in de-
ciding whether tenants in common are in a fiduciary relationship. Id.
45. Miller v. Riegler, 419 S.W.2d 599 (Ark. 1967). The parties agreed that full use of stock
would go to one co-tenant. Id.
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46profits unless there is a rental to a third party, a depletion of resources, or
ouster where one co-tenant refuses to permit another from using or entering
the premises.47
Any tenant in common can bring an equitable action for partition.
48
The common law right of partition has been regarded as unconditional and
absolute.49 The court can either divide the property through a partition in
kind or sell it and distribute the proceeds through a partition by sale.50
Courts prefer a partition in kind and will usually approve a partition by sale
only if the physical characteristics of the property would make the partition
extremely unfair to one or more of the parties. However, partition in kind
may not be available in all cases.52 For example, partition in kind will not
be available where it would curtail or defeat the rights of the other co-
tenant.
53
Although real property and intellectual property are very distinct, the
principles of tenancy in common and joint authorship are similar. For ex-
ample, the joint author has an equal right to possess and utilize every part of
the jointly owned work.54 The joint author also has the right to make testa-
mentary transfers of an interest and to convey or lease any undivided interest
to a third party. Joint authors, like tenants in common, are presumed to
have an equal, undivided interest in a work. 56 However, joint authors have
46. White v. Smith, 214 S.W.2d 967 (Tex. 1948). A co-tenant must account for profits of
minerals taken from property and he is entitled to a deduction for expenses. Id. at 975-78.
47. Ouster is where one co-tenant refuses to permit another from using or entering the prem-
ises. Spiller v. Mackereth, So. 2d 859 (Ala. 1976) (stating that ouster is deemed to occur only
when one co-tenant refuses a demand by one other co-tenant).
48. 2 RALPH E. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §20.04[3] (1998).
49. Willard v. Willard, 145 U.S. 116, 120 (1892); Saulsberry v. Nichols, No. CA 91-289,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 76, at *7 (Ark. App. Feb. 5, 1992); Cheeks v. Herrington, 523 So. 2d
1033, 1035 (Miss. 1988).
50. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 607(3), at 50-47 to 50-61 (1998).
51. Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 30 (Conn. 1980).
52. Baker v. Drabik, 541 A.2d 229, 231 (N.J. Super 1988).
53. Id
54. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, § 4.2.2, at 385 (explaining that "each copyright co-owner
is entitled to exploit the copyright himself or to license others to do so . . ."); NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.10, at 6-30 (stating that "[a] joint owner may, without obtaining the
consent of the other joint owners, either exploit the work himselt: or grant a nonexclusive license to
third parties.").
55. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.09, at 6-29
56. H. R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 51 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736. Pye v.
Mitchell, 574 F.2d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating "each co-author automatically becomes a
holder of an undivided interest in the whole"); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp.
640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (noting that co-owners of a joint work hold their interests as tenants in
common), affid on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997
(1972).
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the right to change this equal division through a written agreement that
would rebut this presumption.
57
In addition, when profits are not acquired from the exploitation of a
work, a joint author may use the work individually without a duty to ac-
count. This is similar to the lack of duty to account for living in a co-
tenant's house. Therefore, in this regard, the duty to account is similar in
both joint authorship and tenancy in common.
On the other hand, there appears to be a distinction between joint
authorship and tenancy in common regarding the duty to account when a
work is exploited for profit. Unlike joint authors who are required to ac-
count for any profits received as a result of a joint work,58 co-tenants only
have a duty to account for profits acquired through rental, depletion, or
ouster.59 However, the only profits available to the joint author are through
an exploitation of the work which reduces the value of the work.6 1 This is
similar to a depletion of resources in real property. Thus, even under the
tenancy in common rule, there would still be a duty to account.
In contrast to the similar principles that exist in joint authorship and
tenancy in common, it is difficult to find analogous provisions in joint
authorship for the real property concepts of partition in kind and partition by
sale. 62 As stated earlier, courts prefer partitions in kind. Many co-tenants
resent the division of property. To these co-tenants land is more than just an
investment because a great deal of emotion and ego is intertwined in prop-
erty ownership.
Likewise, joint authors often have a similar emotional bond with their
work. However, the emotion and ego involved in the tenancy in common
relationship is minor when compared to that of a co-author who has created
an artistic work. The emotional bond between the joint author and his work
is akin to that of a mother and her child. Remedying joint authorship dis-
putes by using tenancy in common concepts is difficult on all the parties in-
57. Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, §6.08, at 6-28.
58. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976) (stating joint authors should be "treated generally
as tenants in common, with each co-owner having an independent right to use or license the use of
a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other co-owners for any profits."); see also NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.06, at 6-14; Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1837
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
59. MOYNIHAN, supra note 35, at 216.
60. See generally id.
61. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121.
62. BOYER, supra note 48, § 20.04[3], at 20-33.
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volved and on the courts. Perhaps this accounts for the courts avoidance of
using these concepts for disputes arising among joint authors.
In addition to courts reluctance to apply tenancy in common concepts
to joint authors, the Copyright Act is silent on the topics of forced sale and
forced partition. It would be very difficult for courts to apply partition in
kind to a copyrighted work. First, they would have to divide the bundle of
rights among the co-authors, which would require expert testimony and
evidence regarding the worth of each right and the future possibilities inher-
ent in each right. Second, courts would have to balance the uncertainties in-
herent in the value of each right. This would be extremely difficult because
courts would be in the unenviable position of evaluating and predicting un-
certainties. The study of new and future technologies alone would be overly
taxing on a court. For example, a court would have to assign a value to the
rights if the work were to be used over the Internet or by any undiscovered
technological advances.
Applying a partition by sale remedy to copyrighted work would also be
difficult for the court. In a partition by sale, the court would forcibly be re-
moving a work of art from its creator. While this may be appropriate in
some tenancy in common cases, it is not an equitable solution in joint
authorship. Joint authorship is a relationship based on collaboration and ar-
tistic influence, more akin to family law than to property law. Further, a
forced partition by sale of a joint work would invoke the wrath and indignity
of the creative community and chill joint authorship.
In the event of a breach by a joint author, the remedy available to ten-
ants in common is woefully inadequate. This is due to the extremely vulner-
able position of the co-authors. Each joint author has the power to cause
great harm to the other's livelihood, well-being, and reputation. Conse-
quently, courts disfavor applying partition remedies to breaches involving
joint authorship. Thus, the fiduciary relationship that the majority holds to
exist among tenants in common is even more precarious and fraught with
commitment in the relationship between joint authors.
IV. FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
A fiduciary relationship is one of trust and confidence where the bene-
ficiary of the trust is owed a duty of utmost loyalty and good faith.6 3 This
duty is even more protective than the duty owed in a confidential relation-
64ship. Traditional fiduciary relationships include employer to employee and
63. DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 10.4, at 680-81 (1973).
64. Id.
1998]
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agent to principal. A fiduciary duty is also owed by a trustee to his benefi-S 65 •• •66
ciary; an officer or director to a corporation and its shareholders; a part-
ner to the partnership; 6 7 joint venturers, 68 spouses; 6 9 and an attorney to his
client.70 These relationships have appeared in courts with enough regularityS • 71
to be termed "conventional" fiduciary relationships. Some unconventional
fiduciary relationships have been recognized including the relationship be-.• 72 73
tween the franchisor and franchisee, vendor and purchaser, and lender
and borrower. 74  While fiduciary duties often arise in relationships which• 75
require close cooperation, courts have avoided setting specific criteria to
determine whether to expand the scope of conventional fiduciary relation-
ships. 76 Commentators theorize that courts are vague about the factors nec-
essary to make a relationship fiduciary, in order to avoid abuse by those who
are clever enough to follow the letter of the law, yet break the trust of a fidu-
77ciary.
65. GEORGE G. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 95, at 341 (6th ed. 1987) (discussing the fiduciary duty
of a trustee).
66. HARRY G. HENN & JomN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 235, at 625 (3d ed.
1983) (discussing general fiduciary duties).
67. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21, 6 U.L.A. 608 (1996).
68. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
69. CAL. FAm. CODE ANN. § 1 100(e)(West 1994); CAL. FMA. CODE § 721 (West 1994).
70. DOBBS, supra note 63, at 681
71. Gautreau, supra note 6.
72. Arnot v. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 884 (8th Cir. 1979). But see W.K.T. Distrib. Co. v.
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 746 F.2d 1333, 1337 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the theory that parties to fran-
chise relationship owe a fiduciary duty).
73. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ryan, 250 F. Supp. 600, 605 (Ark. 1966), aff'd per cu-
ram, 368 F.2d D.C. 177 (8th Cir. 1966).
74. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179, 189 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
75. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American LandLaw, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 91 (1987).
76. Hospital Prods. Ltd. v. U.S. Surgical Corp. (1984) 156 C.L.R. 68 (stating "the authorities
contain much guidance as to the duties of one who is in a fiduciary relationship with another, but
provide no comprehensive statement of the criteria by reference to which the fiduciary relationship
may be established."); see also Gautreau, supra note 6, at 1-2.
[I]t has often seemed as if some sort of mystical invocation were necessary to deter-
mine if the new relationship was a fiduciary relationship; and if it was, there then
followed some sort of internal laying on of hands which imposed a raft of immov-
able obligations and duties on to the shoulders of the fiduciary but precisely how
this happened remained a mystery.
Id.
77. See id. at 3. Even if it were feasible, it might not be desirable for courts to closely define
the demarcation line showing the exact transition point where a relationship that does not attract
fiduciary duty passes into one that does. Id.; see also J. A. C. Hetherington, Defining the Scope of
Controlling Shareholders' Fiduciary Responsibilities, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 9, 11 (1987)
(stating that "by obscuring the limits of fiduciary obligations under moralistic rhetoric and by ver-
bally chastising those who are found to have violated the standard, or come close to doing so, the
courts seek to maintain the standard by discouraging marginal behavior which might or might not
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Courts, however, consider general characteristics when analyzing
whether a fiduciary relationship exists. A close relationship of faith and
trust is required. The resemblance of an arm's length relationship usually
indicates that fiduciary norms do not apply.78 Many courts have looked at
the access the parties have to joint assets and potential for abuse.79 Further,
courts impose a fiduciary obligation to relationships in which one party has
control over the other or over the co-owned assets. °
A. Duties of the Fiduciary
Uttermost fairness, good faith, selflessness, and protection of a vulner-
able party are the cornerstones of a fiduciary relationship. 8 Fiduciaries have
a duty to disclose all relevant facts that they know, or should know, when
entering into a transaction.82  Beneficiaries should understand their legal• 83
rights and obligations before completing a transaction. 8 In a fiduciary rela-
tionship, nondisclosure of material facts is actionable fraud,84 and a person
violate it."); Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON HALL L.
REv. 21, 24 (1992) (stating that "the concern is that if fiduciary law were more clear, it would en-
courage conduct adhering to the letter of the rule while violating its spirit.").
78. DEBORAH DEMOTT, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP: DUTIES IN
ONGOING BusINEss RELATIONSHIPS 472 (1991).
79. Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Obligation, 9 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 310, 347
(1989) ("A person with access is fixed with a fiduciary obligation in order to deter mischievous
conduct.").
80. DEMOTT, supra note 78, at 915. "A fiduciary obligation is nothing more than a device
by which the law responds to situations in which one party's discretion ought to be controlled be-
cause of the nature of the party's relationship with another. This instrumental description is the
only general assertion about fiduciary obligation that can be sustained." Id.
81. WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE,- JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 71 (5th ed. 1993).
82. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 738
(5th ed. 1984); GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 87, 95-96; see RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 381 (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 (1979); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, 551 (2)(a) (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1957).
Ordinarily, a party may be expected to gain whatever knowledge he desires before buying or
selling property by making a diligent inquiry and examination. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976). A relationship of trust and confidence may tend to lull
even a reasonably prudent party into omitting a full investigation. Id. Accordingly, a duty to vol-
unteer material information arises from the expectation of the parties that they will be open and
honest in their dealings with one another. Id. Even if the parties have no such actual expectation,
fiduciary duty doctrine has the effect of imposing it too. Id
83. See KEETON, supra note 82, at 738; BOGERT, supra note 82, at §§ 87, 96;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 82, at § 173; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 82, at § 551(2)(a); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra note 82, at §
170.
84. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (finding that the
purchaser of stock in a closely-held corporation owes a fiduciary duty to the seller to disclose ex-
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with a fiduciary duty must deal fairly and in good faith with the benefici-
85
ary.
A fiduciary cannot deal at arm's length.86 An arm's length transaction
is one in which the parties are acting in their own self-interest and owe no
special duty to each other.87 In an arm's length transaction, parties are gov-
erned by ordinary protections that govern against misconduct. Most busi-
ness transactions are commenced at an arm's length and most are subject
only to the "morals of the marketplace. '"88  In a fiduciary relationship, the
fiduciary cannot compete with the beneficiary or act on behalf of a com-
petitor.89  Furthermore, fiduciaries are under a duty of confidentiality
whereby, they cannot use or disclose confidential information obtained in the
course of the relationship for their own benefit or against the interests of the
beneficiary. 90  Finally, a fiduciary cannot secretly profit from the relation-
ship. 9 '
B. Tenancy in Common as a Fiduciary Relationship
Courts are split over the issue of whether tenants in common are fidu-
ciaries. Some courts have found that one legal consequence of co-tenancy is
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the co-tenants. 92 These
courts have found that a community of interest, where each member of the
community has power over the entire estate, gives way to a community of
duty. 93 Overall, most jurisdictions have found tenants in common to be in
isting arrangements for the sale of assets to a third party at a substantial profit),
85. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) As Judge Cardozo said "[m]any
forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden to
those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place." Id.
86. Id.
87. See DOBBS, supra note 63, at 680.
88. See generally JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-
20, at 367 (3d ed. 1987).
89. See DOBBS, supra note 63, at 680.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Smith v. Borradaile, 227 P. 602, 607-08 (N.M. 1922).
93. NoRMAN A. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA,
158 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that "[t]he relationship between co-tenants has been described as a
community of interest which gives rise to a community of duty... which disables each tenant from
doing anything that would prejudice the others in reference to the common property."); Van Home
v. Fonda 5 Johns. Ch. 388, 407 (N.Y. Ch. 1821); Smith v. Smith, 150 N.C. 81, 82 (1908) (stating
that "these relations of trust and confidence bind all to put forth their best exertions and to embrace
every opportunity to protect and secure their common interest, and forbid the assumption of a hos-
tile attitude by either.").
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fiduciary relationships. 94 The basis of these findings is simply the basic ex-
istence of a tenancy in common.95
On the other hand, a majority of cases dealing directly with the issue of
whether tenants in common are fiduciaries have held that the mere fact that
parties are tenants in common does not, by itself, create a fiduciary relation-
ship.96 These courts have found a fiduciary relationship only to exist when
co-tenants come into possession of the property through the same convey-
ance.97 At the very least these courts have held, if the co-tenancy does not
94. Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 537 (7th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 709 F.2d 408
(1983) (applying Wisconsin law); United States v. State of Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 685 (9th
Cir. 1975) (applying Washington law); McLendon v. Kaolin Co., 782 F. Supp. 1548, 1562 (M.D.
Ga. 1992) (quoting Fuller v. McBurrows, 192 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1972)); Aaron v. Puccinelli, 264
P.2d 152, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Edwards v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 903, 907
(Ark. 1992); Bimbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 575 (N.Y. 1989); Uptegraft v. Borne Pe-
troleum Corp., 764 P.2d 1350, 1353 (Okla. 1988); Foster v. Hudson, 437 So.2d 528, 529-530
(Ala. 1983); Jolley v. Corry, 671 P.2d 139, 141 (Utah 1983); Bartz v. Heringer, 322 N.W.2d 243,
244 (N.D. 1982); Colquhoun v. Colquhoun, 88 N.J. 558, 563 (N.J. 1982); Cummings v. Anderson,
614 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Wash. 1980) (en banc); Kennedy v. Rinehart, 574 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Or.
1978); City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 552 P.2d 1380, 1390 (Haw. 1976); Kennedy v.
Bryant, 252 So.2d 784, 788 (Miss. 1971); Lund v. Heinrich, 189 A.2d 581, 583 (Pa. 1963); Re-
belo v. Cardoso, 161 A.2d 806, 810 (R.I. 1960); Goergen v. Maar, 153 N.Y.S.2d 826, 831 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1956); Salter v. Quinn, 134 N.E.2d 749, 751 (Mass. 1956); Colby v. Colby, 79 A.2d
343, 344-45 (N.H. 1951); Cecil v. Dollar, 218 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1949); Bailey v. Howell,
184 S.E. 476, 478 (N.C. 1936); Smith v. Borradaile, 227 P. 602, 607-08 (N.M. 1922); Van Home
v. Fonda, 5 Johns Ch. 388, 406-07 (N.Y. Ch. 1821); White v. Roberts, 637 S.W.2d 332, 334 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Stoltz v. Maloney, 630 P.2d 560, 563 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Watson v. United
Am. Bank, 588 S.W.2d 877, 882 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Givens v. Givens, 387 S.W.2d 851, 853
(Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Rider v. Phillips, 178 N.Y.S. 142, 145-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919). But see
Jennings v. Bradfield, 454 P.2d 81, 82 (Colo. 1969) (en banc).
95. See DEMOTT, supra note 78. The excessive rhetorical force used in promulgating fiduci-
ary doctrine is a necessary control mechanism that results from the imprecision of the standard.
Id.
96. Merritt v. Nickelson, 287 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Mich. 1980) (stating that "[h]e was not her
agent by the mere fact of their joint ownership .... "); Masick v. City of Schenectady, 564
N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (N.Y.App. Div. 1991). William E. Burby has pointed out that:
[T]echnically, neither a fiduciary nor a confidential relationship arises out of the
concurrent ownership of property .... But even in the absence of a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, it does not follow that there is not a 'guide of conduct' that
regulates transactions by and between co-tenants that relates to ownership of the
property.
WILLIAM E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 99, at 231 (3d ed. 1965).
97. JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 348 (1990). It should
not be supposed that co-tenants will always be regarded as having a fiduciary relationship that will
prevent one from acting for himself to the possible disadvantage of another. Id. It has been sug-
gested that when co-tenants acquire their interests simultaneously by the same conveyance, or by a
testate or intestate succession, the relationship should be recognized; otherwise it not should be
recognized (e.g. where one co-tenant conveys his undivided interest to an outsider, the latter may
well be regarded as having no fiduciary duty to the other co-tenant). Id; see also THOMPSON ON
REAL PROPERTY § 1801 (1979); Gocrgen v. Maar, 153 N.Y.S.2d 826 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
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give rise to a fiduciary relationship the co-tenants have a duty to act in good
faith toward each other.98 The majority of cases here emphasize the timing
of the acquisition in determining whether there is a fiduciary relationship.
As long as the property was conveyed at the same time, whether by the same
instrument or through inheritance from the same ancestor, the tenants in
common have a fiduciary relationship.
99
Other courts finding tenants in common to be fiduciaries have done so
as a result of a wide variety of factual situations, including duties of care, 1°°• 102
loyalty, 10 1 cooperation, and against unjust enrichment over the other co-
tenant. 103 Also, tenants in common may create a fiduciary relationship by
their conduct. 1 04 Courts have also found that a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty was available when one co-tenant took an opportunity that
properly belonged to the tenancy in common. 105
C. Joint Authors as Fiduciaries Under Tenancy in Common
Both the minority and majority views consider joint authors to be ten-
ants in common and fiduciaries. According to the minority view, joint
authors as members of a "community in interest;" are in a fiduciary relation-
ship. t°6 However, the majority holds that tenants in common are fiduciaries
98. Laura v. Christian, 537 P.2d 1389 (N.M. 1975). A co-tenant buys outstanding interest is
said to be holding that interest on behalf of all co-tenant. Id.
99. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 42 § 5.10, at 217 (stating "when [the] co-tenants acquire their
concurrent interests at the same time, either by the same instrument or by inheritance from a com-
mon ancestor, they are held to be subject to fiduciary duties with respect to their dealings with the
common property."); Jennings v. Bradfield, 454 P.2d 81, 82 (Colo. 1969) (en banc) (finding that
unless they claim under the same instrument, "[tienants in common are under no greater legal ob-
ligation to protect one another's interests than would be required of strangers."). Also significant
to the analysis was that the interests were separately assessed and twenty-four years had passed
since co-tenants had sought relief. Id. at 81. See also Dampier v. Polk, 58 So. 2d 44, 51 (Miss.
1952); Watson v. United Am. Bank, 588 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
100. Montcastle v. Baird, 723 S.W.2d 119 (Tenn. App. 1986) (finding a tenant in common to
be liable for interest and penalties arising from failure to file federal income tax returns).
101. Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989) (declaring that fiduciary duty
of undivided loyalty owed by a co-tenant requires avoidance of conflicts of interest).
102. Bartz v. Heringer, 322 N.W.2d 243, 244 (N.D. 1982) (holding that a co-optionee, a po-
tential co-tenant, has a fiduciary duty to cooperate with fellow co-optionee in exercise of option).
103. Edwards v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 903, 907 (Ark. 1992) (finding that
where a co-tenant in possession paid fire insurance premiums and was the named insured, the fi-
duciary relationship between tenants in common requires that the fire insurance proceeds be held
for the benefit of co-tenants).
104. 86 C.J.S. 2d Tenancy In Common § 17 (1954).
105. Moore v. Bryson, 181 S.E.2d 113, 117 (N.C. 1971) (suggesting that the purchase of
property adjacent to common property may be regarded as having been made for the benefit of all
co-tenants).
106. Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388, 407 (N.Y. Ch. 1821).
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only if the conveyance takes place simultaneously by the same instrument. 107
The joint author relationship is similarly created. Copyright law demands
that joint authors have the requisite intent to create and merge the work. 
10 8
Thus, similar to a simultaneous conveyance of tenants in common, creation
of the work by joint authors is no accident. It is calculated and timed to be
completed together or upon merger. Thus, it can be argued that since joint
authors agree to simultaneously convey their work, they can be considered
fiduciaries and subject to rules governing tenancy in common.
This analysis would be different for co-owners who were not joint
authors. All joint authors at some point are co-owners. However, not all
co-owners are joint authors. 109 For instance, a co-owner may have bought or
inherited his share of the work, independent of other owners. However, un-
der the majority view, tenants in common must come into possession of the• time110
property through the same instrument and at the same time. Hence, un-
less the co-owners of the copyright acquire the property simultaneously and
through the same instrument, they would not be fiduciaries.
The joint author relationship is more vulnerable than a co-tenancy be-
cause it is entered into voluntarily and requires intent to collaborate as a pre-
requisite for copyrighting of a joint work.III Under copyright law, the joint
author has the right to make decisions regarding the work on everything ex-
cept exclusive licenses. 112 Tenants in common, operate at an arm's length.
Because a tenancy in common can be transferred through inheritance, co-
tenants often do not have a choice of who the other co-tenant will be. Thus,
joint authors are in an even more intimate position than are co-tenants. 113
Arguably, because joint tenants enter into the relationship voluntarily
and with some degree of planning, they should have the foresight to have a
written agreement describing the duties of each, rather than depending upon
a court imposed fiduciary relationship. However, this foresight is not ex-
107. Minion v. Warner, 144 N.E. 665, 666 (N.Y. 1924); Dampier v. Polk, 58 So. 2d 44, 50
(Miss. 1952); CuNNING-AM, supra note 42, § 5.10, at 217.
108. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (requiring authors to have "[tihe intention that their contri-
butions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole for the creation of a
joint work").
109. 'But see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (discussing works made for hire).
110. CuNNiNGtAM, supra note 42, § 5.10, at 217 (stating "[w]hen co-tenants acquire their
concurrent interests at the same time, either by the same instrument or by inheritance from a com-
mon ancestor, they are held to be subject to fiduciary duties with respect to their dealings with the
common property.").
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)
112. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 121 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736.
Co-owner has "an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of ac-
counting to the other co-owners for any profits." Id.
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pected of parties in other fiduciary relationships."14 Because there is an in-
timacy in the collaborative process of joint authorship and a lack of an arm's
length relationship, parties may feel uncomfortable in asking other parties in
the relationship to sign documents to protect their interest from these close
personal "friends." This close relationship makes it difficult for the parties
to put the terms of their relationship in writing. This failure to protect their
interests leaves them in a vulnerable situation. It is this intimate relationship
that prevents one from protecting his own interests, and has given rise to the
imposition of fiduciary relationships by courts. "15
The real property laws of tenancy in common create a fiduciary rela-
tionship between co-tenants with varying conditions depending on jurisdic-
tion. Because the joint author relationship fulfills these conditions, joint
authors are fiduciaries. Thus, according to the laws governing tenancy in
common, joint authors are fiduciaries to each other and on each other's be-
half. Furthermore, due to the precarious and sensitive nature of the joint
author relationship, courts should impose a heightened duty beyond that of a
fiduciary which is imposed on a co-tenant. This heightened fiduciary rela-
tionship would impose more duties on co-authors.
D. Joint Authors as a Fiduciary Relationship
As mentioned before, fiduciary relationships have been imposed where
there is a "community of interest" 117 and the parties have access to the same
assets. 11  The joint author relationship is a similar relationship. Each co-
author has the right to exploit and license the co-owned work, so long as that
co-author licenses it non-exclusively, 119 and each co-author has access to the
entire work. Similar to a director of a corporation, joint authors can repre-
sent themselves to the world as spokesmen for the entire work. 120 Moreover,
113. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120. "A work is 'joint' if the authors collaborated with each
other, or if each of the authors prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and intention
that it would be merged with the contribution of other authors as 'inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole."' Id.
114. See generally Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv 795, 813 (1983).
115. Id.
116. See discussion supra Part IV. B.
117. See discussion supra Part IV. C.
118. Flannigan, supra note 79, at 310.
119. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, §§ 6.09-6.10, at 6-29 to 6-30. Each co-owner
may grant a non-exclusive license subject to a duty to account for the profits; see also Strauss v.
The Hearst Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1837 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
120. See generally NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, §§ 6.09-6.10, at 6-29 to 6-30.
121. Id.
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joint authors can introduce themselves as both author and owner of the
work. 1  Thus, the joint author is in an even more trusted position than a di-
rector of a corporation and is even more vulnerable than a shareholder.
Similar to a spouse, joint authors expose themselves to the other joint
author in ways that they may not to the outside world. From the initial ex-
position of oneself in the artistic process, through the collaborative process,
to the exploitation following creation, each joint author wields power over
the other. The collaboration process bears the artistic children of the joint
author relationship. The bond many artists feel to their work has been com-
pared to that of a mother to her young. 122 Thus, the joint authorship should
satisfy both the "trust" and "arm's length" factors common to other fiduci-
ary relationships.
Similar to trustees, joint authors have full and easy access to the
work.123 As discussed earlier, courts place great emphasis on access in de-
termining the existence of a fiduciary duty, There are few relationships
with more access to assets than joint authors. Regardless of consent, each
co-author has all but exclusive licenses. Courts emphasize access because
of the temptations of abuse that come with access to assets. 25 Often a joint
author has more access to the co-owned assets than a trustee, who is a fidu-
ciary. Although a partner has a duty to report to other trustees, a joint
author only has to report profits from licensing the work. 1
26
Similar to a partner, joint authors' legal rights are so intertwined that
any use of rights by one co-author has the potential to harm the other.127
The joint author takes the role of the spouse, partner and director in copy-
right law. The joint author relationship is accessible and vulnerable enough
to be ripe for the abuses against which a fiduciary duty guards. It can be
argued that the joint authorship relationship is a "community of interest
128
and, thus, it should be protected by a "community of duty."
129
122. Visual Artists Rights Amendment of 1986: Hearing on S. 2796 Before the Subcomm
on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1986).
123. NIMMER ON COPYRiGHT, supra note 8, §§ 6.09-6.10, at 6-29 to 6-30.
124. Flannigan, supra note 79, at 307-10.
125. Id. (stating that "[a] person with access is fixed with a fiduciary obligation in order to
deter mischievous conduct.").
126. UNIF. PARTNERSHI ACT § 21, 6 U.L.A. 608 (1996).
127. Morden v. Mullins, 153 S.E.2d 629, 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967).
128. Van Home v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 388, 407 (N.Y. Ch. 1821) (stating that a
"[c]ommunity of interest produces a community of duty... to deal candidly and benevolently with
each other."). Id. at 407-08.
129. ld.
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V. DUTIES OF JOiNT AUTHORS AS FIDUCIARIES
Joint authors and tenants in common have the duty to account for
profits resulting from the use or exploitation of the property. 3 0 Also, they
have the duty not to waste or deplete the co-owned assets. 13 1 If there is a
depletion of the assets, they must account to the co-owners and distribute the132 ..
profits. A joint author cannot destroy the work, license the work in such a
way as to cause its destruction, or grant a license in the only medium avail-
able for exploitation. 133 To do so would destroy the value of the work for
the co-owners. In other words, as long as the co-owner's ability to exploit
the work is not infringed, the owners are free to do as they wish.
Joint authors wield incredible power over one another's assets, ego,
and reputation because their work embodies their efforts and personalities.
Thus, the fiduciary duty they owe to each other should be heightened beyond
that of a co-tenant. Indeed, the difficulty in applying the tenancy in common
remedies of partition in kind and partition by sale illustrate the hypersensi-
tivity of the joint author relationship.
Like a corporate director or an attorney, joint authors should owe a
duty of confidentiality to each other. 134 Similar to a partner, a joint author
should make decisions regarding the work in consideration of not only their
interests, but also in the interest of the work as a whole, and where possible,
in the interest of the co-author. 13 Like a parent, joint authors should refrain
from using the work as a weapon against each other. They should not li-
cense or threaten to license the work in a way they know or should reasona-
bly know would antagonize or damage the reputation of the other co-author.
130. NIvMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, §§ 6.09-6.10, at 6-29 to 6-30 (stating that co-
owners are deemed to be tenants in common and, each co-owner may grant a non-exclusive license
subject to a duty to account for the profits; see also Strauss v. The Hearst Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d
1832, 1837 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
131. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, § 4.2.2, at 385.
132. Id. at 385-86.
133. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 8, § 6.19[A] (citing Brown v. Republic Prod., Inc.,
161 P.2d 796, 797-80 (Cal. 1945); Maurel v. Smith, 271 F.2d 211, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1921); see
also Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 82, § 173 (1979). Note that
while all fiduciary relationships are also confidential relationships, all confidential relationships are
not fiduciary relationships. Id.
135. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 21, 6 U.L.A. 608 (1996); HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN &
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 4, at 188, 266 (2d ed. 1990).
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VI. BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
Fiduciaries can breach their duties in a number of ways.136 A fiduciary
relationship is based on trust, loyalty and confidentiality. In addition, any
breach of that relationship is actionable, so long as the injured party can
prove damages.137 The conventional fiduciary breaches include: misappro-
priation, 38 neglect, 139 failure to account for profits,14° breach of the duty of
confidentiality, 14 1 and waste or depletion of resources. 142
Due to the unique and vulnerable nature of the joint author relation-
ship, a breach of a fiduciary duty may manifest itself in very subtle ways.
For example, a breach could arise by revealing confidences relating to the
creative process of the work. Additionally, a breach could occur if joint
authors act in their own self-interest to the detriment of the other co-author.
For instance, a breach can occur if an author deals with a co-author at arm's
length to the co-author's detriment, or if the work is used in such a way to
reduce its value as a whole. A breach could also arise when a joint author
exploits the work in a way that casts the work and the other joint authors in
an unfavorable light. Examples of this could include: if joint authors col-
laborated on a religious hymn which is then licensed by another joint author
to a competing religion; if a vegetarian's co-authored work is used to en-
dorse beef, if a serious noncommercial artist's work is licensed for use in an
advertising campaign; or if a politician's work is licensed to a rival. To
prove such a breach, a joint author would have to show that there was actual
harm to reputation or finances, and that the harm suffered was a result of
such a breach.
Ordinarily, fiduciaries are held to a standard of gross negligence.
143
This would probably require a showing of either malice or, at the very least,
136. See generally Pittman v. Groveowners Loop of Loxahatchee Inc., 534 So. 2d 1207 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539, 552 (1949);
United States v. Re Brook, 58 F.3d 961, 965 (4th Cir. 1995); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 226 (2d ed. 1956 & Supp. 1967).
137. Atwood Grain & Supply Co. v. Growmark, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
138. See Pittman v. Groveowners Coop. of Loxahatchee, Inc., 534 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988).
139. Scott, supra note 136, at 552.
140. Pittman, 534 So. 2d at 1207. The former member of a marketing cooperative sued the
cooperative for breach of fiduciary duty in handling and distribution of profits not in accordance
with the contract. Id.
141. United States v. Re Brook, 58 F.3d 961, 965 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
142. SCOTT, supra note 136, § 226.
143. Id.
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knowledge that such a harm would occur. However, some courts have im-
posed a standard of mere negligence on the fiduciary relationship 144 whereby
the joint author would be liable for any transgression they know or should
know would cause reputational damage, according to the reasonable person
standard. 1
45
VII. CAUSES OF ACTION AND REMEDIES
The only remedy available under copyright law for a breach of joint
authorship is to institute a suit for infringement.146 However, an owner or
co-owner of a copyrighted work cannot be sued for infringement of that
work.14 7  The licensee also cannot be sued if the license was not exclusive
and if permission was received from the co-owner, who according to the
Copyright Act, had the power to license. 148 Thus, the only recourse left to
the inured joint owner is outside the realm of copyright and real property
law.
In cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty, actions for an accounting
have resulted in the award of compensatory and exemplary damages. 150 The
court may exercise a full range of equitable powers, including enjoining the
144. Shannon v. Monasco, 632 S.W.2d 946, 949-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
145. Id.
146. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 1996).
147. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 17, § 4.2.2, at 385 (explaining that "each copyright co-owner is
entitled to exploit the copyright herself or to license others to do so.").
148. Id. at 385-86.
149. Lanham Act § 43(a) of the Federal Trademark Act has become a law of unfair comp-
etition which functions to protect against consumer confusion. Under it, artists have obtained
protection of their integrity rights. It protects against confusion of "goods or services ... use[d] in
commerce... as to the affiliation, connection, or association... as to the origin, sponsorship, or ap-
proval" of one's goods, services, or commercial activities by another person. The Lanham Act was
revised in 1989 by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 43(a), 102
Stat. 3935, 3946. Lanham Act's protection of artist's paternity and integrity rights has been lim-
ited to cases where the artist's name was replaced by another's or the artist's work was mutilated.
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). However, the language of the
Act suggests that it would apply well to works ofjoint authorship. By using an authored work in a
political or religious context, the public can easily be deceived into believing the author endorses it.
This would damage her reputation as an artist and as a human being.
150. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RtBsTEiN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 6.08(a) (citing Interstate Props. v. Pyramid Co., 581 F. Supp. 982, 990 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) which
ordered punitive damages where deliberate disregard ofjoint venture agreement existed); Liggett v.
Lester, 390 P.2d 351, 354-55 (Or. 1964); Int'l Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d
567, 584 (Tex. 1963) (holding that exemplary damages should not be precluded where fiduciary
relationship was breached); Shannon v. Monasco, 632 S.W.2d 946, 949-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(holding that exemplary damages should not be precluded where fiduciary relationship was
breached); Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948, 955-56 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that exem-
plary damages of eight to one ratio were not excessive where secret agreement existed).
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conduct or setting aside the transaction at issue. 151 Further, many courts
have attempted to award compensatory damages in numerous cases involv-
ing a breach of fiduciary duty. 152 Some argue that courts may also award
punitive damages if actual malice is proven.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The joint authorship relationship is unique. It is an intellectual prop-
erty relationship with some real property characteristics, and is similar
enough to a tenancy in common to borrow many of its concepts. However,
it is different enough that many of the concepts controlling real property
should not be applied to the intellectual property relationship. Under many
joint authorship scenarios, neither the laws of copyright nor the laws con-
trolling tenancy in common are adequate. The tenancy in common remedies
of partition in kind and partition by sale are especially inadequate to remedy
joint author concerns. It is necessary to look outside the realms of copyright
and real property law and wander into the meandering world of the fiduciary
duty.
The joint author relationship meets all the requirements of the fiduciary
relationship. Moreover, fiduciary causes of action and remedies fill the void
left by copyright and real property laws and remedies. Therefore, joint
authors should be given the status of fiduciaries and bestowed with all their
rights and obligations.
151. Tucker Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 972-75 (2d Cir. 1989)
(granting preliminary injunction to prevent monetary payments to partner who breached fiduciary
duty); Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. 739 F.2d 661, 669 (1st Cir. 1984) (recognizing
right of specific performance as remedy for joint venture); Tankersley v. Superior Court, 706 P.2d
728, 731-32 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that full accounting is not necessary where parties
have.contracted out of accounting, and that suit for damages was still proper).
152. Hanes v. Giambrone, 471 N.E.2d 801, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (affirming award of
compensatory damages where there was constructive fraud that breached fiduciary duty); Jennison
v. Bierer, 601 F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (D. Vt. 1984) (granting compensatory damages to the plain-
tiff); Prince v. Harting, 2 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (ordering partner that breached fidu-
ciary duty to pay damages even where no final accounting occurred); Veale v. Rose, 657 S.W.2d
834, 837 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (reiterating that breaches of fiduciary duty may be remedied by
awarding compensatory damages to injured partner).
153. See Frank J. Cavico Jr., Punitive Darnages for Breach of Contract - A Principled Ap-
proach, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 357, 377 (1990). "Punitive damages are appropriate where a breach
of contract comprises a breach of fiduciary duty. Even though the relationship may arise from the
contract, recovery is grounded upon breach of the implied-in-law duty created by the relationship
rather than from the breach of contract itself." Id.
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